China's Contemporary Cultural Revolution, Voicing the Tensions of a Democratised Culture by Eden, Michael
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The rest of the world may have to seriously consider how 
the rise in Chinese power will affect our lives. Western 
hegemony is waning, and its stewardship of world culture 
is a mixed bag: freedom and equality are stained with 
slavery and exploitation; democracy and free votes are 
mixed with apathy and corruption. This is not to say that 
any other nation or state would do better, or that other 
epochs have been all light and purity, but the West may 
struggle to convince the peoples of the world of its values 
and, by extension, the rationale for keeping its place as 
the globe’s defining culture. Western culture needs to live 
up to its own ideals. Part of that will mean convincing the 
world that these ideals are worthwhile now the era of force 
is over. The values of individual freedom, free speech and 
free access to information are key in the development 
of an educated people with agency; moreover they are 
inventive drivers within a flourishing civil society. But 
how certain are we that they are the natural results of 
technological progress?
China is gathering momentum as an unstoppable force 
in the modern world, growing its economic and soft-power 
influence while simultaneously maintaining the largest 
army on the planet. If we consider freedom of speech and 
access to information as central to our lives, thinking of 
the internet, we may well wonder whether China’s example 
will prove to be the template for our future rather than 
our industrial past. The winners and losers as a result 
of China’s paradoxical technological boom are evident 
in cities containing multiplying millionaires adjacent to 
blinking trinket factories where workers, under pressure, 
resort to suicide. Perhaps within the nuances of these 
changes the biggest winners are the Communistic Party 
of China (CPC), a multi-armed regulatory body whose 
grip on the lives of over a billion individuals has not been 
weakened by the competing pull of that great Western 
kraken, the World Wide Web.
Amongst the tectonic cultural forces shifting and 
grinding for global ascendance are creative voices who 
through elegant works of art are resisting the central 
spread of homogeneity that is new China by offering 
difference and choice within the social templates of what a 
future human might be.
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History of alternative perspectives in 
China: Stars Group. 
During his lifetime Mao Zedong set out 
an attitude to art outlawing anything 
that didn’t appeal to the masses and 
support the official doctrine of the 
one-party state. Self-expression in art 
was prohibited. This kind of control is 
not aimed at artists in particular, but 
at any dissemination of information 
which might create new perspectives 
and therefore weaken state control 
over the outlook and sympathies of the 
people. In the digital age contemporary 
Chinese authorities are trying to control 
the electronic flow of information 
by blocking swathes of the internet, 
mirroring Mao’s concerns. The tacit 
understanding here is that Chinese 
society is not a homogeneous unit; 
within the commonalities there are 
crucial differences that are dangerous 
enough to necessitate enforced silence.
Infamous for his use of the internet, artist Ai Weiwei is 
possibly the most obvious combination of both disruptive 
forces: art and online activity. Ai’s father, a poet, was 
condemned as a rightist under Mao’s rules, his life 
turned upside down and the family sent to labour camps. 
Artists also fell into this category, individuals who dealt 
in creativity and alternatives, and who might undermine 
propaganda or rally people to a cause. The Stars Group 
emerged out of this background. Beginning in 1979 they 
fought hard for recognition after being denied a space 
to show their work, making enemies of local and national 
officials along the way:
Stars responded by organizing a protest march in the 
name of individual human rights. Starting out from the 
Xidan Democracy Wall, the demonstrators made their 
way to the headquarters of the Peking Municipal Party 
Committee under the banner ‘We Demand Democracy 
and Artistic Freedom’. Finally, from 23 November to 2 
December 1979, the First Stars Exhibition was held in the 
Huafang Studio in Beihei Park, Beijing. - Zee Stone Gallery
Operating in Beijing until 1983, the 
group consisted of many artists who 
would subsequently make their name 
abroad: Ma Desheng, Huang Rui, Yan 
Li, Yang Yiping, Wang Keping, Qu Leilei, 
Mao Lizi, Bo Yun, Zhong Ahcheng, Shao 
Fei, Li Shuang and Ai Weiwei. In 1983, 
under increasing pressure from officials, 
the group disbanded and the leading 
protagonists left China for global 
recognition as part of a vibrant  
creative diaspora:
Speaking from the history of Chinese 
art, Star painting will indeed be an 
incident. Many say: Oh, a bunch of 
young people are still childish. The work 
is immature, indeed admitted, but as a 
phenomenon and an event, it plays a 
very important role in the history of the 
development of Chinese art. - Qu Leilei, 
‘Every single star shines independently’,  
                               news.99ys.com
Known as the June Fourth Incident, the 1989 Tiananmen 
Square protests are the most famous suppression of 
democratic activism in China. The protests were student-
led and, broadly speaking, demanded greater say in 
decisions, more freedoms and rights. If the authorities 
might have flirted with compromise in the past but 
this quickly evaporated and martial law was declared, 
partly due to the spread of protests around the country. 
Armed troops shot between 180 and 10,454 citizens - the 
discrepancy in these numbers alone is testament to the 
deep divisions that still exist within a society not ready to 
bear the realities of an open investigation.
Both Tiananmen Square and Stars Group are subject 
to restricted internet searches in China, which means 
some or all relevant information is redacted. In the case 
of Tiananmen Square, no mention of the protests is visible 
when searched for in Chinese.
Netizens in China 
The internet can be seen as an exaggeration of this 
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kind of relationship. It offers people 
alternative sources and the means to 
organise and publish information. In this 
sense it is often thought of as having 
naturally democratic features, and is 
also connected to self-expression and 
personal freedom. The internet’s arrival 
in China in 1994 (after some brief activity 
in the late 1980s) was met with suspicion 
by the authorities. At that time their 
experiences with artists and students 
had primed them to spring promptly 
into action to set up their defences and 
implement restrictions to internet use. 
Today, a quarter of the world’s internet 
users reside in China, subject to the 
aforementioned restrictions1,  and 
e-commerce is increasingly relevant in 
stabilising the economy.
Golden Shield and the Great Firewall 
By 1997 the Chinese government was 
taking serious measures to block and control the internet. 
These combined laws and technologies such as the 
Great Firewall include methods such as IP blocking, DNS 
filtering and redirection and SSL attacks.
Fostering the sense of being listened to or watched 
is extremely effective and leads to what is called ‘chilled 
speech’2 , whereby people’s fear of punishment inhibits 
their free communication. The Great Firewall has allowed 
China to effectively develop its own easy-to-influence 
versions of websites, such as Tencent, Alibaba and Baidu. 
There are also versions of YouTube and Twitter. Finance 
companies like Zhima Credit assist the government in 
prosecutions and information gathering (which they 
claim is voluntary). Sometimes called Golden Shield, many 
government departments co-operate to share information 
about users, as well as blocking or controlling webpages. 
Successfully blocked sites include Facebook, Gmail, 
Google, YouTube and many more. Droves of technocrats 
are employed to spy on people and redirect them to pro-
government sites and content.
New forms of control: technology 
Mara Hvistendahl reports that in China 
many people are making financial 
transactions online, and that companies 
like Zhima Credit are engaging in social 
ranking and aiding the government with 
ever greater controls
According to Xinhua, the state news 
agency, this union of big tech and big 
government has helped courts punish 
more than 1.21 million defaulters, who 
opened their Zhima Credit one day to 
find their scores plunging. The State 
Council has signaled that under the 
national social credit system people 
will be penalized for the crime of 
spreading online rumors, among 
other offenses, and that those deemed 
‘seriously untrustworthy’ can expect to 
receive substandard services. - Mara 
Hvistendahl, ‘Inside China’s Vast New 
Experiment in Social Ranking’, Wired (December 2017)
This useful digital tool is also a handy way for the CPC 
to guide and influence their citizens, who are increasingly 
encouraged or required to shop, save and bank in this way.
Censoring the internet 
China’s suppression of the supposed naturally democratic 
forces of the internet is a colossal task, and is understood 
to be model for those states who would like to carry out 
similarly high levels of control.
An article by Simon Denyer (with contributions from Xu 
Yau Jingjing), ‘China’s scary lesson to the world: Censoring 
the Internet works’3, was featured in the Washington Post 
in 2016, and many of their observations remain concrete 
almost two years later. The thrust of the article confirmed 
what many in the know were already aware of, and what 
has increasingly become a normal fact of life in China: 
that the authorities there have successfully developed 
and updated their strategies for controlling the internet 
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in such a way that trade and what the authorities see as 
‘benign’ use are not interrupted.
Of course the ‘normalisation’ here is simply another 
‘truth’ in our time of ‘alternative facts’ and ‘post-truth’ 
tendencies. Dong Lishen, senior researcher at the Hong 
Kong and Macau Affairs Office of the State Council, 
writing in the South China Morning Post represented 
the nuances and sophistication of this normalisation as 
far back as 2013, supporting the CPC’s censorship and 
security measures, and even asserting that the authorities 
‘should’ or ‘must’ go further and do more to ensure ‘social 
harmony and lasting political stability’. This raises the 
frightening possibility that similar strategies might be 
behind the UK government’s current plan to straighten 
out the internet. More control is always tempting for 
those who must uphold the law. If China’s stance on 
internet access were to become ascendant over the West’s 
generally permissive attitude, who wouldn’t be affected?
China needs a diverse and multi-layered legal system 
for cyberspace. The National People’s Congress and the 
State Council should formulate administrative rules and 
regulations. Government departments should develop 
specific operational procedures and a sound legal 
system. This can help promote a stable and harmonious 
community in cyberspace. And, to keep abreast of changes 
in the online world, the relevant authorities should, from 
time to time, publish white papers or assessment reports 
to address in a timely fashion any social problems that 
arise, to ensure the sustained and healthy development of 
cyberspace. - Dong Lishen, ‘Why China needs new internet 
laws to fight the online rumour-mongers’, South China 
Morning Post (20 September, 2013)
The tone is forceful but civil and measured throughout. 
Lishen states many times what the government ‘should’ 
do, and there is an abundance of terms such as ‘safeguard’, 
‘social harmony’, and ‘stability’. The Machiavellian point 
is that the authorities are already doing these things, 
and Lishen’s prompts for action can be read as bolstering 
existing policy. Unless, of course, you read the article as a 
veiled entreaty for dissent through official media channels, 
the overtly propagandist tone of stability and harmony 
might be the result of a tongue planted firmly in a cheek. 
Such is the manner in which information is shared under 
an authoritarian regime.
Even assuming its sincerity, however, Lishen’s article 
shows some Western bias and habit, opening with images 
referencing punishments doled out by the CPC to the 
Orwellian-termed ‘rumour-mongers’ who have got on 
the wrong side of the authorities due to their online 
activity. A Western reader would naturally expect this 
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kind of opening gambit to be followed 
by calls for greater freedom of speech 
and internet usage. However, regardless 
of Lishen’s actual intentions, to the 
general Chinese reader the article’s 
encouragement of prison sentences for 
‘rumour-mongers’ highlights the very 
real moral and compelling topography of 
contemporary China
China is a nation acutely aware of its 
history; from Confucius and ancestor 
worship to stories of the Long March, 
the cultural thrust of China is that the 
individual is officially subsumed into 
society. Bearing in mind that the lot of 
the average Chinese person has been on 
a upward trajectory for over thirty years, 
it is easy to see why propagandist writers 
like Lishen find an audience amongst 
those who wish the fast-moving boat to 
remain unrocked.
Moreover, the compact of a 
capitalised system is that it regenerates 
and reproduces consumers, the modern rhetoric of 
which is centred around individual needs and personal 
desires. Both of these ‘attitudes’ are flawed and require 
re-evaluation moving forward. Denyer describes China’s 
vision of ‘internet sovereignty’, which is a neat term for 
heavily censored and controlled use that still allows 
people and businesses to spend money. This is essential 
and makes the investment in both the Great Firewall and 
Golden Shield clearly necessary. China can’t just switch 
off the problem since, as Denyer writes, e-commerce in 
China accounts for forty per cent of the global total. For 
Lishen, the CPC has a duty to provide this ‘sovereignty’ for 
people, to ensure their safety and wellbeing. He sees the 
introduction and upholding of laws and restrictions as 
particularly vital;
While China is still adapting to this new world, internet 
use is expanding rapidly and an online community has 
emerged almost out of the blue. Figures show that at the 
end of 2011 there were more than 500 million internet 
users on the mainland and 250 million microbloggers. 
More than 38 per cent of the population had internet 
access. In this seemingly unfettered world, many people 
have gone beyond what is deemed 
acceptable in a traditional society, where 
law and order prevail.  
- Dong Lishen, ibid.
He goes on to correctly quote the 
many laws passed by the US to ensure 
that their version of ‘safe’ is upheld. It’s 
a subtle way of drawing attention to 
a feeling many countries have of the 
double standards inherent in US policy, 
and Western conscience in general. 
Lishen does not condemn any of these 
actions but does use them as evidence 
that China should develop its own 
approach. It’s worth noting that as more 
and more working-age Chinese people 
require job, the government needs 
e-commerce and digital technology to 
take pressure off the building industry, 
since its staggering consumption of 
concrete and building of ghost cities to 
propel the economy forward has a finite 
physical limit.
China needs the internet: the 
connections and money it offers provide upper-working-
class and middle-class Chinese people a living. Their ranks 
have swelled in recent years and they won’t be content 
to labour on building sites on the Mongolian border4.  
These people are increasingly international and if there 
is change to come it will more than likely be in response 
to the demands of China’s upwardly mobile middle class. 
Whether these people will care enough about their 
personal freedoms to risk displeasing the authorities 
is another matter. Next time you feel smugly rebellious 
because you have tweeted insults at Theresa May or 
lampooned Donald Trump in a witty Facebook update, 
consider that in China ‘rumour spreading’ on the internet 
carries a three-year prison sentence:
Defying the state 
We might also recall Ai Weiwei’s very public use of the 
internet to voice his dissatisfaction at the regime. Weiwei 
is just such a problem, pulling out of his part in the 2008 
Olympics (Ai was commissioned to design the Bird’s Nest 
Stadium) and protesting at the shoddy building work 
and government cover-up that, in Ai’s view, contributed 
significantly to the death toll of the tragic Sichuan 
159 
earthquake. Weiwei’s Snake Ceiling and Remembering, 
shown in Japan and Germany, directly recalled and 
criticised that tragedy and ultimately led to his infamous 
disappearance, torture, heavy surveillance and finally 
banishment. Ai now lives in Germany and reports grimly 
that his mother tells him, when he calls for news: ‘Never 
come back,.’ It is clear why many dissenting voices end up 
finding their audience in the West. Weiwei and those like 
him are just the sort of people Lishen has in mind when  
he states:
We have to fight against misinformation 
and comments intended to incite social 
unrest and infringe on civil rights, in 
order to protect citizens’ right to express 
their opinions legally. This should be the 
main aim of internet legislation.  
- Dong Lishen, ibid.
Perhaps no one has done so much 
to trespass against such values as Ai 
Weiwei while still holding on to his life 
(albeit in a different country, and after 
being tortured).
Artists are by no means the only 
ones offering resistance to government 
controls. If that were the case, there 
would be little chance of any change 
at all. Artists can be useful, though, 
to channel ideas, and like perceptive 
canaries in a mine they can show us 
what’s not acceptable.
This gives us a clear image of what 
sort of information is prohibited and 
what kind of characters are finding 
themselves on the wrong side of the 
Chinese authorities.
Qu Leilei, ‘A Chinese Artist in Britain’ 
A contemporary of Ai Weiwei is Qu 
Leilei, an equally important artist who 
has made his home in Britain and 
who is currently showing work at the 
Ashmolean (until 15 April 2018). His show ‘Qu Leilei: A 
Chinese artist in Britain’ is a wonderful tour de force, 
showcasing his technical ability, experimentation and 
sensitivity. At first glance it’shard to see why the work and 
the man are out of favour with the Chinese authorities, but 
we have to remember that Qu was previously a (founding) 
member of the controversial Stars Group, and so he was 
one of those guiding minds that defined the authorities’ 
cold attitude towards colourful upstart artists and their 
radical sympathies.
[W]hile some of the most successful 
modern Chinese artists, having achieved 
a popular style or subject-matter, keep 
on repeating themselves, Qu Leilei, when 
he has fully explored the possibilities of 
one form, or subject, moves on to explore 
another. - Professor Michael Sullivan
The same man whose gentle touch 
that blends Western and Eastern 
traditions so masterfully and produced 
the beautiful images above, owing much 
to impressionism and Matisse (hardly a 
call to arms), is also the rabble-rouser 
and figurehead pictured below marching 
against the government in 1979 (centre 
right with yellow placard).
Of course, there was always 
something radical about impressionism, 
which reacted against the gloomy 
and austere propaganda of the state-
favoured neoclassicism by switching 
focus from gods and military heroes 
(getting the French public ready for 
violence) and exploring instead ordinary 
people, pastimes and places. This 
radicalism is harder to notice, but it’s an 
evident link to early modernism and can 
also be seen in the portrait series called 
‘Everyone’s Life is Epic’.
Qu is a canny tactician and has 
shown his work in China as well as in the 
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West; his art can be seen both as a kind 
of ‘rite of survival’ for both humanity 
in inhumane times and as a call for 
inclusive togetherness.
Surely the human hand is one of the 
most difficult things to draw; but not 
only does he draws hands beautifully; 
he makes of them a powerful image 
expressive of thoughts, feelings, 
humanity, and love.  
- Professor Michael Sullivan
This is most evident in Qu’s calmer 
works, and is a very clever way to 
generate sympathy for his ideas, like 
playing moving music over a scene 
in a film to heighten the emotional 
kick. Indeed, his close-ups of hands so 
lovingly portraying platonic bonds bring 
to mind filmic strategies for inducing 
catharsis and empathy. Even these works, though, have 
a hidden violence. The hands clasping one another are 
desperate and earnest. These are intense images, given 
extra impact and made cinematic by the grand scale. 
These motifs - hands, nudes and portraits - have been 
shown in Beijing. The messages are subtle enough not to 
attract too much unwanted attention or dredge up sore 
old grudges.
Danaë is also a wolf in sheep’s clothing, artistically 
speaking. The passive beauty lying in an almost foetal 
position on decorative fabric is non-threatening. Her pose 
and frame are typical of many nudes, absent in much 
traditional Chinese art, and Qu is here connecting himself 
to Western art history by tackling the subject.
We might glance at this, take pleasure in her form, and 
his skill in missing the mythological reference. Almost a 
veiled threat, Danaë was the wronged mother of Perseus 
who was shut up in a box with her child by a cruel and 
power-obsessed authority. She was cast adrift, only to be 
saved by the gods and raise a great hero who returned 
to defeat Medusa and the Kraken and who, in true Greek 
style, inadvertently destroyed the man 
who had so desperately tried to get rid 
of him and his mother. The symbolism 
of that discreet reference allows a more 
radical reading to take place.
Qu does almost make more direct 
work in terms of his unambiguous 
feelings toward the military and the 
political overtones in China. The 
‘Empires’ series is more like Banksy in 
concept (if Banksy were a formidable 
draughtsman with a greater level of 
sensitivity and a really dangerous 
background against which to work). 
These images are explicit and 
concern a highly controversial issue 
in China. They portray the rigidity of 
thinking required to ‘do your duty’ 
without question. The reference to the 
Terracotta army is as much about the literal inert matter 
as it is about being owned as rigid automaton in service, 
body and soul, to the empire personified as the emperor.
The work echoes concerns in China that the army, 
which is said to have more men than any other, should be 
reduced. The sense of history repeating is simultaneously; 
humorous, vicious and deeply felt for Chinese viewers. 
Consider the figure in The Soldier, a masculine product 
of the regime, already redundant in the wars which rage 
in economies, online and in the soft-power exchanges of 
aid and trade. Where is the place for these hundreds of 
thousands of young men? Shall they all be retrained as 
tech-savvy bureaucrats?
It’s unclear whether this work has been shown in China. 
Searches show only the less explicit work and the reviews 
in Chinese magazines omit reference to these more 
powerful works. Ironically, the variety of the work by this 
dissident artist allows for a selection to be made suited to 
the contrasting attitudes and tastes of both Chinese and 
Western official audiences. In each case, a culture chooses 
its own. 
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Zhu Wei 
Zhu Wei lives and works in Beijing, 
and his criticism of the regime is 
intermingled with sharp observations 
of the culture at large. Zhu is concerned 
with the break in historical development 
that the Chinese faced when Mao 
instigated the Cultural Revolution. 
This saw the denouncement of many 
traditional layers of Chinese culture, 
and included the destruction of art and 
historical relics, as well as the infamous 
burning of the Wanli Emperor (Ming 
Dynasty), whose remains were dug up 
by the extremist Red Guards, denounced 
and destroyed.
This kind of ‘purging’ has occurred 
in Russia and Nazi Germany, and has 
nothing to do with improving the lives of 
ordinary people, who are often goaded 
into destructive acts to preserve those in 
power. Zhu goes further than this and sees these fractures 
as damaging the ‘collective unconscious’. We see this kind 
of madness today in the mass destruction of pre-Islamic 
art in the Middle-East by extremist groups. At least part 
of Zhu’s practice is an attempt to re-establish the links 
between this once-forbidden past and the problematic 
present. From 8th of Feb to the 24th of march 2018 
Zhu Wei is showing work, ‘Virtual Focus’, at the Kristin 
Hjellegjerde Gallery in London.
The Ink and Wash Research Lecture Series is a reflection 
on tradition. It uses the techniques of ink painting to 
examine the malaise of a contemporary society, a place in 
which the government and the individual exist perpetually 
at odds. These almost generic figures are the receivers of 
what he refers to as ‘stability maintenance’ – a government 
trying to create ever more compliant behaviour in its 
citizens in the bid for social unity.  - Zhu Wei: ‘Virtual 
Focus’, Kristin Hjellegjerde Gallery, 2018
Regarding his experiences of being an artist in China, 
Trebuchet wondered whether Zhu Wei had experienced 
the ‘constraints’ of Chinese culture? And also whether, as 
an international figure, he saw any flaws 
in the ‘freedoms’ of the West?
Zhu Wei: Forty years ago, the Cultural 
Revolution in China eradicated the 
accumulation of our culture and 
civilisation thoroughly. This eradication 
does not have any positive meaning; 
instead, it made us backslide to the 
Middle Ages in the name of revolution 
and progress. This kind of retrogression 
could be catastrophic in any country in 
the world, even worse than the result of 
a war. People will be aware of the cruelty 
of a war, knowing that it’s destined to 
be a disaster, but the cultural disaster is 
collective unconscious, and the result of 
which is that it can happen again at any 
time, on a greater scale, because people 
have accumulated the experience for 
similar movement.
China is inheriting the reins of global power and is 
becoming ever more relevant in the world. Is that 
reflected in the attitudes and views of people in China? 
It is a rare quality in China to learn from others humbly. 
After the ten-year baptism of the Cultural Revolution, 
people are accustomed to false, big and empty talk, and 
adults will be blushing and even uneasy for several days 
after telling the truth, as if they are telling a falsehood. 
In the 1980s, when China had just opened its door to the 
outside world, we had been modest for a while, but it didn’t 
take long before people started to think there was nothing 
good in the Western countries.
The reason is that we are still living in two different 
times and spaces. On the surface we are seemingly related 
to each other, but in fact we are on two parallel tracks. 
For example, before the Reform and Opening-up, political 
movement was the mainstream. Every Chinese attached 
importance to ideals and despised wealth. The poorer, 
the more fashionable, and women would love the poorest 
ones. At that time Chinese people thought the Western 
countries did not have ideals; they were too realistic, and 
too specific, which should be criticised.
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In the 1980s, after the Reform and Opening-up, 
economic movement became the mainstream, the 
government advocated that the minority should get 
rich first, and then the entire society began the pursuit 
of wealth endlessly. People love the richest ones, and 
people love the rich Western countries. When the Chinese 
travelled abroad, they found that sometimes people in the 
Western countries are not so rich, and some even look 
poor; they ignored that most Westerners have religious 
beliefs, most Western countries have a balanced developed 
society, but started to think that the Western countries are 
too unrealistic, too ideal, so they are seemingly not worth 
learning from.
Many of your works portray dissatisfied and thoughtful 
soldiers/officers. Can you explain the middle-class 
tension in China around the size of the army and the 
cost of paying for so many soldiers, since the country is 
not involved in armed conflict? 
This is actually common sense, but it is late for us to 
know it because there is no such education. When I was 
a soldier, I only knew that the food was too poor and the 
living conditions were too bad in all aspects. I thought 
that the government should allocate more money to the 
military, to improve its pay and conditions. I didn’t know 
that the military had so much money, or that the money 
from the government is paid by the taxpayers.
The curtain in your work has a dual meaning: this 
communist reference is undercut with a sense of hope 
as your use of the colour red is apparently auspicious 
in Chinese culture. That said, the curtains are often 
fragmentary and full of holes. Can you explain the 
tension between those concepts? 
China has had little to do with red for thousands of years 
of her history. In some dynasties, emperors associated 
themselves with yellow, which represents the dignity and 
elegance of the royal family, such as the Qing dynasty. 
Red came from the West, representing communism and 
revolution and progress. For more than sixty years, until 
today, red has always been a symbol of the red regime. As 
an artist, recording accurately the characteristics of the 
society is an obligation and responsibility.
I became famous when I was twenty-six. It was a good 
feeling when I was young, but now I think it’s a burden 
because every step of your way you will be noticed by 
many people, and it will lead to cautiousness and fear of 
failure. I have given up on quite a few experiments, and 
some of them might have been really successful.
You have created an image of Marx that appears quite 
sensitive, employing traditional skill, but the feeling 
of this image and its companion image of Engels is 
unclear. The faces seem rubbed out or as if they are 
behind frosted glass. What are your feelings about Marx 
and his legacy? 
Marx is one of the many European philosophers. He is well 
known in China for his theory and his book Das Kapital, 
and today Marxism-Leninism is still serving as the guiding 
ideology of this country and guidelines that all people 
should follow. I’m not a fan of this guy. His theory may 
be immature and at least in his own country it has been 
outdated and abandoned. Not following his social theory, 
Germany is a rich and respected country today. His legacy 
is an ordinary outdated empty talk, such as the discussion 
of ‘surplus value’.
Your images about dreaming are inspiring. This act of 
dreaming, relatively unobserved here in Britain (where 
dreaming is seen just as a side effect of sleep), is a 
form of transformation. It seems like the freedoms we 
have, say, access to information over the internet, are a 
distraction and do not really necessarily help us become 
better or more free and creative. Do you think that 
people in both cultures dream too small? 
Your question expresses the difference between two 
civilisations, which is two different dreams. Today in China, 
even artists and cultural scholars are talking about money 
and how to make more money. The more you earn, the 
more successful you are. Freedom is specific here. For 
example, the more money you have, the more you feel 
free. You can do whatever you want to do. Of course, the 
premise is to be alive, and then you can eat, drink, travel, 
buy real estate, replace cars, replace wife. When 1. 4 billion 
people are pursuing the same game, you can imagine how 
cruel it is.
164 Feature
China 
Im
ag
e 
:Q
u 
Le
ile
i, 
Bl
ad
e 
of
 li
gh
t (
19
98
). 
im
ag
e 
co
ur
te
sy
 o
f t
he
 a
rt
is
t.
165 
As an established painter, what motivates you to 
continue making art? 
The difference between my work and other contemporary 
art from China is that it is done within a native painting 
style, a different painting style from the East. It does not 
synchronise with Western contemporary art, and it has its 
own characteristics and aesthetic way. My starting point 
for every creation is to make an innovation. My motivation 
is to record and leave some things and characteristics of 
this era.
Chunwoo Nam 
In contrast to Zhu Wei, Chunwoo Nam’s digital prints have 
a slightly different tone. As a Korean-
American, he uses his cultural plurality, a 
little distanced from both great powers, 
to see the negative and positive sides 
of both Eastern and Western forces, 
represented by China and America. He 
was awarded the Grand Prize from the 
Seoul International Print Biennial 2011 
for his ‘We Are Here’ suite (below).  
He currently lives and works in the 
United States.
Nam’s series, recently renamed ‘Their 
Globalisation’, has been interpreted very 
differently both as a call for greater 
integration and as a celebration of 
blending and interdependence:
One-time cultural enemies locked in a 
dance of interdependence. Communists 
and Capitalists dancing around their 
former ideologies. Cultures becoming 
intertwined on the constant flow of 
goods and money. In this suite of 
prints the Korean artist Chunwoo Nam 
visualizes this dance of cultures and calls 
into question the ideologies that held 
these two cultures apart as enemies for 
so long. By combining their symbols of 
power (their flags) and place (Tiananmen 
Square, Times Square), he creates a view 
of these cultures whose dance is shrinking our globe and 
also our cultural divide. Chunwoo seems to be telling us 
‘Dance On!’ - Clay Street Press
What began as a statement of arrival and positivity, 
perhaps in line with the quote above, has more recently 
become disillusioned. The renaming hints at distance 
and alienation, exemplified by the addition of the striking 
digital print Chimerica Flag. The dancing figures are gone; 
behind the familiar Chinese stars is the fractured and 
persistent US dollar, strangely confined behind what now 
seem like vertical bars. Money and its circulation is the 
motor of ‘Their Globalisation’.
More recently Nam has explored the 
internet, in Individual Story VI. The work 
is more personal and melancholic, but 
the sensitivity and humanity of Nam’s 
intensions make his practice compelling:
[T]he mecca of popular culture is 
silenced, reminding us that social class 
and access to information, finances, 
and the internet are defining culture 
in a global economy. American culture, 
often focused on assimilation, can leave 
the cultural outsider isolated, as if in a 
remote field where the masses of people 
become blades of grass, slowly growing 
over, engulfing and burying the vestiges 
of culture that remain in this modern 
metropolis - Essye Klempner, EFA Center, 
New York
In China there are real obstacles and 
controls that prevent its netizens from 
accessing the truth. In America and the 
West this is largely not the case, but do 
we care about the truth? What do we do 
with this information? Do we simply turn 
away from it towards more palatable 
narratives? This question put me in mind 
of one of America’s most perceptive 
writers, Ray Bradbury:
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The most important thing to know about 
Fahrenheit 451 is that it is explicitly not 
about government censorship. (Bradbury 
was so firm on this point he once walked 
out of a UCLA class when his students 
tried to insist it was so.) The firemen 
aren’t burning books on the orders of 
some shadowy Big Brother. They’re 
doing it, protagonist Guy Montag is told, 
because society as a whole turned away 
from the scary cacophony of knowledge, 
from the terror of differing opinions 
and the burden of having to choose 
between them, from deep and troubling 
thoughts. - Chris Taylor, ‘Fahrenheit 451: 
Did Bradbury’s Dystopia Come True?’, 
mashable.com (6 June 2012)
Bradbury’s attitude was infamous, 
as it didn’t fit neatly into the liberal 
consensus (of the time) that an evil force 
prevented our great becoming. Rather, 
as Taylor observes, he felt that we often simply can’t be 
bothered with tough issues and turn away in favour of less 
testing themes. This, a dig at American popular culture, 
is a lesson that must not be forgotten when we criticise 
China’s attitude to freedom of information. Nam’s works 
appear to have moved in this direction, tellingly in the 
works which include his observations on his daughter’s 
assimilation (or lack thereof) to middle American culture.
The freedom we have can be complex and bittersweet, 
and it is by no means complete We can be confident, 
though, that we are better off on our journey to freedom 
than those in China, who risk being disappeared if 
they speak out too persistently. Alienation seems to be 
universal, common to both East and West. The Chinese 
authorities are keen to draw parallels between their 
interventions and the American government’s when it 
comes to individual freedom.
The Gift 
Simon Denyer, quoting the expert Rogier Creemers, claims 
that Edward Snowdon’s revelations about America’s 
internet surveillance are ‘the gift that keeps on giving’, 
preventing the West from taking the 
moral high ground. China may be 
restrictive, but America is intrusive.
[A]s revealed by NSA whistleblower 
Edward Snowden, the US government 
has wantonly resorted to various means 
to monitor the e-mail and internet traffic 
of citizens, infringing on their basic 
rights, in an effort to protect national 
security. - Dong Lishen, ibid.
We can add here recent claims 
about Russian involvement in election-
rigging in the US (largely taken to be 
internet-based manipulation). We might 
imagine the CPC mandarins, ever more 
reassured by their own strategies, secure 
in the knowledge that no such foreign 
interference would be possible within 
their borders. We might also consider 
Trump’s use of Twitter to be very bad 
PR for internet freedom among Chinese bureaucrats, 
especially when he goads North Korea and refers to 
mass destruction, making the Chinese president appear 
dignified by comparison.
China can learn from the US experience and never allow 
anyone or any institution to monitor or eavesdrop on 
ordinary citizens or infringe on their basic rights on the 
grounds of national security and social stability.  
- Dong Lishen, ibid.
It’s a point not missed by Lishen, who clearly explains 
the more palatable laws the US has, compared to China, 
but then swiftly reminds us that to really protect its people 
the US has to break those rules and violate those rights. 
Lishen’s rationalisation of the state’s interventions, and his 
sense of being ‘at ease’ with sanctions and punishments, 
is justified by a sound, if totalitarian, logic. This version of 
‘normal’ battles for hegemony with what is ‘normal’ in a 
faltering West whose credibility is damaged.
Hopes for open horizons 
There are two hopeful points to emerge from Lishen’s 
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article reflected in the Chinese 
authorities’ attitudes and actions. Both 
are unintentional, and the first requires 
a clear reversal of his intention to shock 
the reader:
The rapid development and popularity 
of the internet has created new problems 
in the social landscape. Traditionally, 
people have been defined to a large 
extent by their professions, titles or class. 
Such ‘labels’ create boundaries and exert 
an unseen pressure on people to help 
them maintain self-discipline.  
- Dong Lishen, ibid.
The breakdown of ‘classes’ and 
‘types’, and the removal of limitations 
to communication that these caused, is 
seen as a horror to be controlled, and is 
applied here to convince us that a lack of 
conformity to certain types and classes 
is a lack of self-discipline tantamount to rebellion.
The strategies of the CPC are certainly aimed at 
reinforcing these categories and ensuring people 
remain very much in their box. Our optimism may come 
from simply seeing this breakdown and the further 
development of this as a positive, allowing people from 
different jobs, classes and economic areas to create new 
dialogues and demand new privileges.
The second hopeful point, ironically, makes me think of 
Mao and requires a little more subversion:
Everything under heaven is in utter chaos; the situation is 
excellent. - Mao Zedong
Of course, considering the Great Firewall, Golden 
Shield, the State Internet Information Office and the 
bureaucrats employed in various dystopian-sounding 
organisations to manage online activity, we might see that 
any disorder is truly nascent, an embryo at best, which 
could yet be stillborn.
Asking the Experts:  
Reflection and Conclusions  
Reflecting on these pertinent issues, 
Trebuchet asked some experts about 
their opinions on the issues in this area.
Madeline Earp is the Asia research 
analyst for Freedom on the Net, Freedom 
House’s annual index of global internet 
freedom. Earp collaborates with local 
researchers to assess internet access, 
censorship and user rights in fifteen 
countries across East, South-east and 
South Asia, and authored the report’s 
China chapter in 2014 and 2013.
Zixue Tai is the author of ‘The Internet 
in China’ and numerous papers on the 
internet, technology and consumerism in 
China. Zixue is also associate professor 
in the School of Journalism and Media at 
the University of Kentucky.
Do you think, as some have said (Ai Weiwei, for 
example), that eventually the internet in China will 
inevitably wrest itself free of governmental control? Is 
there a real sense of dissent in China, or does the regime 
have the unwieldy internet under control? 
Zixue Tai: Many people in the West have made similar 
arguments in that the internet has not changed anything 
in China, and it won’t do that any time soon. That is 
misleading and misses the larger issues. The internet has 
brought about a lot of change within the country already, 
and will continue to do so down the road. Online tirade, 
protest and petition can be found online every day, but it 
focuses mainly  on daily issues and matters of concern to 
the ordinary citizens.
Most people stay away from politics or taboo topics that 
are classified as sensitive by the state. The government, 
especially at the local level, has changed a lot in how it 
deals with citizens in recent years, largely due to popular 
pulse online. So there has been resistance among the 
people when issues affect their everyday life.
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One example is the expunging of ‘low-class’ workers 
by the Beijing municipal government. Its unmerciful and 
heavy-handed approach caused uproar in the online 
world, and the Beijing government has changed its 
approach lately, and has spoken publicly in an effort to 
appease popular sentiment.
This does not mean that the government will become 
soft in dealing with similar issues, of course, but it reflects 
a change in the new environment, and it shows how the 
anger of the people must be taken into consideration by 
the authorities.
Madeline Earp: I don’t think anything about the internet 
or freedom is inevitable. If anything, the latest Freedom 
on the Net research underscores how many political 
figures around the world are using digital technology 
to undermine democracy through covert influence, 
campaigns and cyberattacks.
However, I would say that the internet has made access 
to all sorts of information and services much easier in 
China. Controlling that requires a very different level of 
investment, which, so far, the government has been willing 
to make. But even then it’s not watertight.
Right now, those who look for it can still find content 
that the authorities would consider subversive. It’s just that 
it’s unlikely to hit the mainstream, and leaves those people 
vulnerable to heavy criminal punishments.
Zixue, in the three years since your paper ‘Networked 
resistance: Digital populism, online activism, and mass 
dissent in China’ appeared in the International Journal 
of Media and Culture, do you feel the situation in China 
has improved for the  
Zixue Tai: Yes and no. One can find both answers 
regarding average citizens’ access to information, 
depending on what cues and specifics one is looking for. 
There is evidence that state censorship of online networks 
has significantly strengthened in recent years, with the 
total takeover by the new regime, as seen in a series of 
regulations and directives on cleansing information online 
and overseeing conventional (print and broadcast) media.
There have been a number of news reports about the 
targeting of VPNs in China. VPNs have been used as a 
common way to bypass information control within China 
to access overseas websites for years. But people have 
noted that it has become harder and harder now to resort 
to that strategy, as they have become prime targets of 
official cracking. Also, monitoring has been tightened 
across popular social media sites and applications in 
China in the past two to three years. So in this sense, free 
access to information has suffered. Hence the answer ’no’.
On the other hand, more and more people have become 
more sophisticated in gaining access to the information 
they are looking for, and a growing portion of the netizen 
population has turned tech-savvy in ‘climbing the wall’ 
(the Chinese term forusing tricks to bypass the Great 
Firewall). So, when there is a certain type of information a 
segment of the people would like to get, there are ways of 
achieving that.
In this regard, Ethan Zuckerman proposes his ‘cute cats 
theory’, which claims that social media, by allowing people 
to share what seems to be mundane information (cats, 
dogs, what they eat, etc.), cultivates a way of life, and thus 
poses a great threat to the authoritarian regimes. 
Once online networks become embedded in everyday 
life for ordinary people in China, they become used to the 
type of information they communicate among themselves, 
and they will likely invent ways of resistance to official 
control and government censorship. This is the ‘yes’ part of 
the answer.
In Mara Hvistendahl’s article ‘Inside China’s Vast New 
Experiment in Social Ranking’ in Wired5,  credit scores 
in China are discussed. The writer claims that even old 
people buying fruit are paying digitally for the goods, 
which racks up a score. David Harvey has observed that 
‘debt-encumbered home owners don’t strike’, and so this 
raises the question of whether the new financial systems 
and digital technology might play nicely into ever more 
strategies for control for the government? 
Madeline Earp: These social credit experiments based 
on online activity are a concerning development. There 
are no meaningful privacy protections for internet users 
in China, so the fact that personal data is being compiled 
on this scale leaves many people vulnerable to leaks and 
exposure, for a start. And we don’t know yet the extent to 
which political opinion or ethnic or religious identity could 
factor into credit scores, but it’s obviously a concern.
Zixue Tai: That is perhaps a stretch, connecting the easy-
pay system to government control. Up to this point, the 
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development has been unequivocally businesslike. It is a 
system invented by the few commercial conglomerates to 
their advantage, and is marketed to the average citizens as 
a convenience.
Credit has never reached the level of penetration in 
China as seen in most Western markets, and this idea of 
smartphone payment suddenly caught on overnight. This 
is mainly due to the high penetration of smartphone apps 
in China, dominated by just a few big companies (Alibaba 
and Tencent).
Because everybody has access to these platforms, and 
people found out that it’s really handy. If the government 
wanted to use ‘debt-encumbered home owners’ as a 
leverage of its information control, then it could easily bite 
back and could get out of control in bloating the national 
debt, thereby crashing the economy. That is no small risk 
that the government will have to think about.
There has been a lot written about internet control in 
China. Are the people themselves aware of how much 
restriction there is? And is there actually a real hunger 
for change? 
Madeline Earp: There are dissidents and businessmen 
who are very aware of the constraints and have to deal 
with daily inconvenience and risk. Then there are many 
others who are less aware, or less disrupted. And those in 
between, including some who encounter restrictions more 
or less by accident and are driven to dig deeper and find 
out why they can’t access something hosted on Facebook 
or a news article that is blocked.
There are plenty of people who view information 
control as a necessary evil, perhaps buying into the state 
media propaganda that it’s a measure to protect China 
from foreign influence. But I think the pressure point 
comes when ordinary people find their lives disrupted, 
which is happening increasingly often. Someone might 
criticise a local official, even in a closed chat group, and 
find themselves subject to an administrative fine. Or the 
internet might slow down dramatically around a sensitive 
political event, even though there are so many people 
who rely on a good connection to conduct daily business. 
That’s not acceptable, and it’s not sustainable. So it creates 
a sense of frustration, which builds over time into hunger 
for change.
The Chinese authorities talk a lot about double 
standards from the West, and in particular from the US, 
around information control (often mentioning Snowden 
and the revelations about mass surveillance). In your 
experience, does this line of argument find popular 
acceptance among Chinese citizens?
Zixue Tai: The answer to this question is not uniform, 
because the populace is quite diversified, and there is not 
a homogeneous group of citizens taking the same attitude.
There is certainly a segment of citizens who align 
themselves very well with government rhetoric and state 
propaganda. At the same time, there is a significant 
portion of the people who challenge the government 
talk. This is especially so among people who have a solid 
understanding of the West.
A lot of people are aware that the type of information 
control the Chinese authorities brand is not the same 
kind of control they experience in China. This stance is 
particularly common among intellectuals.
One thing of note in the past decade is that there is a 
special faction of Chinese citizens (the so-called leftists) 
who become nostalgic for some aspects of the Mao era (for 
example, social stability, the perceived absence of official 
corruption, job security, low pollution levels, and so on), 
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Zhu Wei in his studio. Image courtesy of the KH Gallery. 
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and they most often side with the Chinese authorities in 
chastising Western countries on just about anything you 
can think of. But that remains a small faction, and does not 
speak for the overall trend.
The majority of the people don’t even care much about 
the presence of information control, as long as they can 
go about their everyday life. In other words, most people 
are quite happy the way it is now, and it does not matter 
that much to them if the government blocks their access 
to certain types of information. So, the weapon of the 
government in its ability to enforce information control is 
to maintain economic growth and prosperity so that the 
average folks stay focused on their immediate needs and 
pressing gratifications.
Is there any justifiable argument for the way the CPC 
control freedom in this way? Are people protected from 
harmful images or hate speech, for example, or is it 
really all about quashing any alternative voices? 
Madeline Earp: There’s no justification for restricting 
freedom of expression and information, and we know that 
campaigns to ‘clean’ the internet aren’t successful, because 
there are still plenty of criminal incidents and unrest and 
explicit content.
Censorship hasn’t had any measurable effect on 
safety - on the contrary, it means citizens don’t trust the 
information they receive, or can’t get information when 
they need it most. That actually puts more people at risk.
So it’s easy for the authorities to play on people’s fears 
that they or their children will be exposed to danger 
online, but the control we’re documenting is clearly the 
leadership trying to protect itself.
The number of sites or social media accounts catering 
to political dissidents and religious or minority groups 
that are shut down in campaigns to clean up supposedly 
harmful content underlines the fact that the real target of 
information control is organised opposition.
Taking that into account, what are your hopes for 
internet freedom and digital technology in China? 
Madeline Earp: Obviously I’d love to see the resources 
that are currently being channelled into monitoring and 
restricting what people can do with the internet redirected 
to support improved access and quality of service. Given 
the tightening controls we’ve documented under Xi 
Jinping, I think that’s unlikely to happen in the short term! 1.Th
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Image: Chunwoo Nam, Individual Story I (2007) Image courtesy of the artist
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